, like several theorists before them, attributed cases in which selections in the Wason 4-card task match the prescriptions of formal logic to a special kind of deontic reasoning. They proposed that a utility model of card selection governs performance in deontic contexts. We show that such "logical" performance can be obtained in nondeontic contexts as well, contexts in which utility cannot explain differential card selections. Our results also cannot be explained by Oaksford and Chater's information-gain model without violating a fundamental assumption of that model, the rarity assumption. Our data challenge Oaksford and Chater's framework as well as any theory of selection-task performance that attributes logic-like performance to a special kind of deontic reasoning.
The Wason four-card selection task (Wason, 1966 ) is one of the most commonly used experimental techniques for studying human reasoning about conditional implication. The task gained renewed prominence when performance was observed to change dramatically in certain contexts. For example, in contrast to Wason's original findings, Cox and Griggs (1982) showed that people are likely to choose the cards consistent with formal logic when asked to role-play an authority responsible for enforcing a drinking rule in the form of a conditional implication: "If a person is drinking beer then the person must be over 18 years old." Oaksford and Chater (1994) , like other theorists before them (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Cosmides, 1989; Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992; Rips, 1994) , ascribed this change to some special quality of deontic contexts, contexts in which reasoning concerns social duty or obligation. In such contexts, actions and outcomes have clear costs and benefits that make utility a useful language for describing people's preferences and modeling their choices. Oaksford and Chater took advantage of this by developing a utility model to explain why reasoning in the selection task follows the dictates of formal logic in such contexts. However, we show that selection-task reasoning follows logic's dictates in other contexts too, contexts in which the notion of utility is of no help. Oaksford and Chater have no way of accounting for our data within their framework. But they are not alone; no other existent theory is able to either.
Oaksford and Chater's Model
In their article, Oaksford and Chater (1994) presented a pair of Bayesian models that, on the basis of a few simple assumpAmit Almor and Steven A. Sloman, Department of Cognitive and Linguistic Sciences, Brown University.
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tions, account for many of the reported results obtained with the selection task. Reasoning in two contexts, abstract and thematic, was modeled by two separate and distinct mechanisms. Reasoning in the abstract selection task was modeled as a process of maximizing "information gain." Reasoning in the thematic selection task was modeled as maximizing "utility." Following is a short description of the two models.
In the model of the abstract selection task, each of the four visible card faces is assigned an "expected information gain" value. This value expresses the expected amount of information about the validity of the rule that can be gained by turning this card over. It depends on three parameters-the prior probability of the event p; the prior probability of the event q; and the prior probability of the relation ifp then q. Oaksford and Chater (1994) argued that the typical abstract selection-task response reflects the order of the expected information gain of the four cards. Under what Oaksford and Chater called the "rarity assumption," namely that the prior probability of the events p and q is very low, the order of the expected information gain of the four cards is: expected information gain (p) > expected information gain (q) > expected information gain (~q) > expected information gain (~p). This explains why people's most common selection pattern in the abstract task is to turn over just the p card or to turn over both the p and the q cards. One merit of this model was in showing how people can act rationally and still respond in a way incompatible with the prescription of formal logic. By conceiving of rational selection as the choice that is likely to contribute the maximal amount of information about the validity of the tested rule, Oaksford and Chater showed that people's seemingly illogical selection could be construed as a rational one.
In contrast to the information-gain model, the model Oaksford and Chater (1994) proposed for the nonabstract task is based on the notion of utility. Each possible card is assigned a value expressing the utility of the combination of events described by the card. Thus, the second model requires four additional parameters expressing the utilities of all possible P and Q combinations. The target quantity calculated in this model is the expected utility associated with each visible card face, and not the expected information gain as in the first model. The expected utility of each visible card face is calculated as a weighted sum of the conditional probabilities of each possible invisible side, given the visible side. The weights are the utilities of the events described by the possible cards. Participants' selection is modeled as the set of cards with the highest expected utility. In a typical deontic context, when the four cards are sorted by their expected utility, the following order is obtained: expected utility (p) > expected utility (~q) > expected utility (q) > expected utility (~p). According to Oaksford and Chater, this order explains why in typical deontic contexts the predominant selection pattern is to turn over the p and ~q cards, which also happens to be the response prescribed by formal logic.
Deontic Contexts Versus Deontic Reasoning
The appeal to separate forms of reasoning in order to explain participants' different responses in different selection problems is by no means unique to Oaksford and Chater's (1994) model. Indeed, the predominant view is that a selection compatible with the prescription of formal logic is the product of a special kind of reasoning (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Cosmides, 1989; Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992) . Because the contexts that have been found to elicit this response are deontic, these researchers have come to believe in the existence of a kind of reasoning unique to such contexts. Unlike nondeontic selection-task reasoning, which is about verifying whether a certain rule is true, deontic reasoning in the selection task involves ascertaining that a rule is being followed, more specifically, that a social imperative is being respected.
Although the exact form of deontic reasoning is still under debate (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985 , 1989 Cosmides, 1989; Politzer & Nguyen-Xuan, 1992) , a consensus has emerged that a predominant p& ~q response pattern in a selection task involving an unfamiliar rule is the product of deontic reasoning. Two main properties are responsible for that: (a) Only deontic contexts have been shown to consistently yield a high proportion of &p& ~q responses with unfamiliar rules (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Cosmides, 1989; Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992; Manktelow & Evans, 1979) . (b) Only in deontic contexts do people's responses depend on the perspective they are cued into (Cosmides, 1989; Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992) . Deontic contexts are characterized by the presence of two parties, an actor and an enforcer. Both parties have opposite interests pertaining to a certain relation that can be expressed as conditional implication. Cosmides (1989) showed that participants were not likely to make the p& ~q selection when cued into the perspective of an external observer trying to verify a rule. However, after being cued into the perspective of the rule enforcer, participants were likely to make the p&~q selection. Gigerenzer and Hug (1992) showed that participants' predominant selection, given a certain rule, can be switched from p& ~qto the ~p&q cards by cueing them into the opposite perspective (actor versus enforcer).
Both properties are explained by the model of Oaksford and Chater (1994) , but are also accounted for by previous explanations (Cosmides, 1989; Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992) . The Oaksford and Chater model stands out because it is a formal model of the selection task, and thus its assumptions are susceptible to a detailed examination. Most important here is the assumption that a high proportion ofp& ~q responses is a consequence of the assignment of utilities to the events described by the cards. Deontic contexts concern situations in which people have personal interest in actions and outcomes, interest that affords meaning to the concept of utility and explains how different card choices could be assigned different utilities and how from different perspectives the same card choice could be assigned different utilities. However, differential utilities cannot plausibly be assigned in every context. A dominant response of p& ~qin such a context could not be explained by the Oaksford and Chater model.
The experiments described below were designed to show that p&~q responses can be induced by nondeontic contexts in which utilities provide no useful information. Although the data we report undermine a specific assumption of Oaksford and Chater's (1994) model, our objection is a more general one. While we accept a distinction between two kinds of reasoning, one that yields responses compatible with the prescription of formal logic and one that does not, we do not believe that available data show that the dividing line lies between deontic and nondeontic reasoning. Rather, available data show that we should distinguish reasoning in contexts that successfully evoke clear expectations for what could be the state of affairs, expectations that happen to have a structure like conditional implication (ifp then q, but if not p then either q or not q), and reasoning in contexts that do not. In deontic contexts people have clear expectations, and these expectations are of the form leading people to respond in a way compatible with the prescription of formal logic (if action then precondition, but if not action then either precondition or not precondition). However, we believe that other contexts exist that license similarly strong expectations and that also lead people to respond in a way compatible with the prescription of formal logic. In Experiments 1 and 2 we tested our belief by constructing four nondeontic contexts that we hypothesized would evoke a set of expectations similar to the one evoked by deontic contexts. These contexts were familiar enough for participants to be able to apply their general knowledge, but the rule that was used in each context was unfamiliar so that participants would not be able to make use of memorized experiences with it . We predicted that participants would make selections identical to the ones they make in deontic contexts (i.e., would be more likely to choose the p and ~q cards). Such a result would be incompatible with Oaksford and Chater's utility model and also with their information-gain model because, under the rarity assumption, their nondeontic model cannot predict a high proportion of p& ~~q responses.
Following is a brief description of each context: 1. Containment. Consider the rule "If a large object is stored then a large container must be used." It is likely that people would have clear expectations pertaining to containment. A large object suggests a large container but not a small one whereas a small object is compatible with either a large or a small container. Similarly, a small container suggests a small oh-ject but a large container is compatible with either a large or a small object.
2. Force dynamics. Relations between conflicting forces of different strengths (cf. Talmy, 1988) are also likely to yield clear expectations. Consider the rule "If the weak force wins, then the strong force must have been weakened first." This rule suggests an association between the weak force winning and the strong force being weakened and between the strong force winning and both the strong force being weakened (because it may not have been weakened sufficiently) or not. Also, if the strong force has not been weakened, it is reasonable to expect that the strong force would win. If it has been weakened, it may or may not win depending on how much it was weakened. This arrangement of forces can be thought of as a more general case of permission. The strong force is the permission granter, and the weak force is the party granted the permission. For that party to take the action, it must first weaken the strong force by fulfilling the prerequisite.
3. Prize winning. Winning a prize can also yield the desired pattern of expectations. The rule "If a product gets a prestigious prize then it must have a distinctive quality" suggests the following three expectations: getting a prize means having a distinctive quality, but not getting a prize means either having a distinctive quality or not having a distinctive quality (not getting a prize does not imply no distinctive quality). The symmetric expectations are suggested as well. Not having a distinctive quality suggests not getting a prize whereas having a distinctive quality can either lead to winning a prize or not.
4. Quality control. Finally, quality control can yield similar expectations. The rule "If the product breaks then it must have been used under abnormal conditions" suggests that the product breaking means that it was used abnormally, whereas the product not breaking means that it was either used abnormally or not. Again, the symmetric expectations are also suggested.
In each of these cases, we proposed that participants would form clear expectations about the rule and that these expectations would mimic the structure of conditional implication in formal logic. We expected a high proportion of p& ~q responses for each problem because we believe that participants would prefer to examine the cases for which they have had a clear expectation about what they would find on the other side. In Experiment 1, we employed concrete versions of the rules described; in Experiment 2, we tested the rules in the abstract.
Experiment 1: Concrete Nondeontic Selection

Method
Materials. We constructed one rule from each domain. In the containment condition, participants were told of two kinds of fruit, big ones and small ones, and two kinds of boxes, extrafortified ones that were made of wood and regular ones that were made of cardboard. Participants verified the following rule: "If big fruit are packed, then a wooden box must be used." In the force-dynamics condition, participants were shown the following text: "Normally, Spanish matadors do not get gored during bullfights. However, because of the lifestyle of many matadors it is not rare to see drunk matadors in those bullfights." Participants were asked to see if the following belief, which is held by many Spanish bullfight aficionados, is true for fights in which the matador wins: "If the bull is young and strong, then the winning matador must have been sober." In the prize-winning condition, participants were asked to verify a claim made in a recent article in a film magazine, namely, "If a film is nominated for an Academy Award, then it must have sex." Finally, in the quality-control condition, participants were told of "two kinds of bulbs, high-quality ones and low-quality ones. High-quality bulbs are designed to operate in very high temperatures and are assigned numbers which indicate the maximal temperature at which they can operate without breaking." Participants were asked to find low-quality bulbs that did not meet the standard for high-quality bulbs that have the number 1,000. The standard for high-quality bulbs with the number 1,000 was: "If the bulb broke, then it must have been heated to over 1,000 degrees." This problem is a modified version of a problem used by Markovits and Savary (1992) in a study in which they showed that participants were able to make the correct logical derivations from the rule. Although Markovits and Savary did not observe a high proportion of p& ~q responses in a selection problem based on this context, we suspect the reason was that their participants were asked to test a causal rule (i.e., "if a light bulb is heated to more than 500 degrees, then it will break") and not a quality control standard rule.
We included two control tasks. First, in order to verify that these materials do indeed lead to a high proportion of p& ~q responses relative to the original task, we used the original abstract four-cards selection problem. Participants were told about four cards that had a letter on one side and a number on the other. Participants were asked which of the cards they needed to turn over in order to verify the following rule: "If a card has an 'A' on one side, then it must have a '4' on the other side." In order to verify that the proportion of p& ~q responses we obtained was comparable to that obtained in the permission contexts, we used the postal rule permission problem (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; as a second control. Participants were told that the postal service had decided to increase profits from private mail. Because, unlike business mail, private mail is typically sent in sealed envelopes, the postal service had set up the following rule: "If a letter is sealed, then it must have a 35-cent stamp." Participants were instructed to imagine that they were employees of the postal service and that their job was to enforce this rule. They were asked to identify the envelopes that violated it.
Procedure. Forty-one Brown University undergraduates participating in two introductory cognitive science classes volunteered to answer all six problems. The order of questions was balanced across questionnaires. The order of cards (p, q, ~p, ~q) was changed between questions in the same questionnaire to prevent participants from using card order as a cue. Following the questionnaire, participants indicated if they were familiar with the task.
Results
The percentages ofp&q, p, andp<£ ~q responses from the 39 participants who were not familiar with the task are shown in Figure 1 . A greater percentage of participants selected the correct p and ~q cards in each of the five concrete problems than in the abstract problem. The differences in the number of the p&~q responses between the concrete problems and the abstract problem were submitted to a Cochran's Q test. Four of the five problems yielded a significantly higher number of p&~q responses than the abstract problem: containment, Q( 1) = 6.4, p < .012; force dynamics, Q( 1) = 10.29, p < .002; prize winning, Q( 1) = 8, p < .005; and permission, Q( 1) = 8.01, p < .005. The only nonsignificant difference was between the quality control problem and the abstract problem, Q( 1) = 1, ns. However, unlike in Markovits and Savary's (1992) exper- iment, which used a similar context, quality control performance differed systematically from abstract performance in that it did not yield many p or p&q responses either, a result for which we have no explanation (63% of quality control selections included the ~ q card, but only 36% were p& ~ q; the other 27% did not follow any consistent pattern).
Because we wanted to test whether permission yielded more p&~q responses than the other concrete problems, we carried out another set of tests comparing the number of p& ~q responses in the permission problem to the rest of the concrete problems. The only concrete problem that yielded a significantly lower number of p& ~q responses was the quality control problem, Q( 1) = 4.57, p < .04. The other three concrete problems did not yield a significantly different number of p&~q responses, Q( 1) < 1 in all cases. The force-dynamics problem yielded as many p& ~q responses as the permission one. Of the four novel problems, the force-dynamics one was the least familiar to our American undergraduates. This suggested that familiarity was not responsible for our results.
Discussion
The results supported our hypothesis that in contexts assumed to yield strong expectations that happen to match the structure of conditional implication, participants selected thep and ~q cards as frequently as in the deontic permission context. These results pose a p-oblem for Oaksford and Chater's (1994) model because they are not deontic, yet they lead to performance that can be obtained only with their deontic model.
Experiment 2: Abstract Nondeontic Selection
Although the chosen domains were not deontic, the presentation style of the specific tasks in Experiment 1 could have suggested a deontic interpretation, encouraging participants to impose utilities on these tasks. For example, the large proportion of p& ~q responses in the containment problem could perhaps be attributed to participants adopting the perspective of someone responsible for packing the fruit, or for supervising fruit packers. In that case, participants were really performing a deontic task, trying to detect violations of the packing rule, perhaps acting on the basis of utilities they attached to the different outcomes. A similar argument could be made for the prize-winning and quality-control problems. Moreover, the quality-control problem may have induced participants to look for counterexamples and not perform a selection task at all. Although the same argument could not apply in the case of the force-dynamics bullfight problem, we decided to test participants' performance on an abstract problem in each domain, a problem that was decidedly nondeontic and in which participants were explicitly asked to verify the truthfulness of the rule. Cheng and Holyoak (1985) compared the original abstract problem to an abstract permission problem ("If one is to take action 'A', then one must first satisfy precondition 'P'"). They found a considerably high proportion of p& ~q responses with this rule, although markedly less than in the concrete permission rule. We wanted to see whether abstract versions of our problems would also yield high proportion of p& ~q responses. If the large proportion of p& ~q responses in Experiment 1 was due to a deontic interpretation of each task, this effect should disappear in the abstract problems that cannot be interpreted deontically. However, if these contexts elicit expectations in the way that we have suggested, then the proportion of p&~q responses obtained in our abstract problems should match the proportion of p& ~q responses in the abstract permission problem. To further discourage a deontic interpretation, we explicitly cued participants into the perspective of the original Wason selection task, seeking to ascertain the truthfulness of the specific rules.
Method
Materials. We used the four abstract rules described earlier in the description of the four domains. In the abstract containment condition, participants were told of large objects and small objects and of large containers and small containers. They were asked to help a fictitious figure, George, to verify his belief that "if a large object is stored, then a large container must be used" by deciding which card or cards he should turn over. In the abstract force-dynamics condition, they were told that two conflicting forces operate on an object; one force is weak, and the other is strong. Participants were asked to role-play a scientist who questions the truthfulness of the force-dynamics rule, "if the weak force wins, then the strong force must have been weakened first," because she thinks that the weak force can sometimes overcome the strong force. The problem was to decide which one of four experiments could aid the scientist in verifying the rule. In the abstract prize-winning condition, participants were cued into the role of a journalist for a consumer magazine who is preparing an article about products winning prizes. Their task was to decide which of four products could be used to verify the rule "If a product gets a prestigious prize, then it must have a distinctive quality." In the abstract quality-control condition, participants were to take the perspective of a quality inspector in a factory that produces certain products. They decided which of four cards describing four tests made on different exemplars of the product needed to be turned over to see if a standard was met, namely, "If the product breaks, then it must have been used under abnormal conditions." The control conditions were the abstract four cards selection problem used in Experiment 1 and the abstract permission problem from Cheng and Holyoak (1985) : "If one is to take action 'A,' then one must first satisfy precondition TV Procedure. A different group of 38 Brown University undergraduates participating in introductory cognitive science classes volunteered to answer all six problems. The experiment was conducted using the same procedure as Experiment 1.
Results
No participants indicated that they were familiar with the task. The percentages ofp&q,p, andp&~qresponses from the 38 participants are shown in Figure 2 . A greater percentage of participants made a p& ~~q response to each of the five thematic-abstract problems than to the original abstract problem. The differences between the thematic problems and the abstract problem were submitted to a Cochran's Q test and all were highly significant: containment, Q( 1) = 14, p < .0002; forcedynamics, Q(\) = 13.24, p < .0003; prize-winning, Q(l) = 7.36, p < .007; quality-control, Q( 1) = 8.33, p < .004; and permission, Q( 1) = 14,p< .0002.
As before, we wanted to test whether abstract permission yielded more p&~q responses than the target problems. We carried out another set of tests comparing the number ofp& ~q responses from the permission problem to the number of p&~q responses from the target problems. No target problem yielded a significantly different number of p&~q responses, Q( 1) < 1 in all cases.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 replicated and extended the results of Experiment 1. The finding that a high proportion of p& ~g responses could be obtained in nondeontic contexts with unfamiliar rules is incompatible with either of Oaksford and Chater's (1994) models. In particular, because our materials cannot be assigned utilities, they cannot be handled by Oaksford and Chater's utility model.
Conclusion
We have shown that in a range of nondeontic thematic contexts, a high proportion of p& ~q selections can be obtained. This finding complements previous work showing that a deontic context was not necessary to make responses more consistent with logic. For example, Johnson-Laird and Wason (1970) showed that reducing the set of choices to only q and ~q makes participants more likely to choose the ~q card over the q card. Platt and Griggs (1993) showed that asking participants to explain their choices also increased the number of p&~q selections (cf. Wason, 1969) . The present study stands out in demonstrating a high proportion of p& ~q responses merely by manipulating the thematic context of the rule tested, without any procedural changes to the task. Together, the results of our experiments undermine the value of distinguishing reasoning in deontic and nondeontic contexts. Moreover, they show that the notion of utility is insufficient to account for cases in which selection performance is compatible with the prescription of formal logic.
Our results cannot be explained by the information-gain model of Oaksford and Chater (1994) because, under the rarity assumption, this model does not predict a high proportion of p&~q responses. Without the rarity assumption, this model would be capable of assigning a higher informational gain to thẽ q card than to the q card, which could be used to account for our findings. The problem with this suggestion is that the conditions of its application are unclear. When should we assume rarity and when should we not? The events referred to in the concrete versions of our materials are at least as rare as vowels and even numbers. Thus, if one accepts the rarity assump- tion for vowels and even numbers then one should be inclined to accept it for the events described in our problems. Without an a priori criterion for the applicability of the rarity assumption, loosening it in order to apply the nondeontic model seems futile. Although we reject a crucial assumption in Oaksford and Chater's (1994) account, we agree with their assertion that the selection task is often interpreted as a problem of uncertain reasoning and not deductive reasoning, as is commonly assumed. We believe that Oaksford and Chater have had a major insight: People treat the Wason task as they treat most tasks that confront them in daily life, examining uncertain states of affairs to obtain informative answers.
According to our intuitions-the same intuitions that have guided us in constructing the problems we used-people's performance in the selection task is governed by their beliefs about the dependence relations in the problem. This belief causes them to form probabilistic expectations that they can test as they select cards. For example, in the containment problem we used, a reasonable belief was that a large object was likely to be stored in a large container, whereas a small object was likely to be stored in either a small or large container. We posit that the informativeness of the cards was relative to this set of expectations. This set of expectations happened to be analogous to those of conditional implication (if antecedent, then conclusion also means that if no antecedent, then either conclusion or no conclusion). Our speculation is that the structure of this set of expectations was what underlay performance in our thematic contexts and the analogy to conditional implication was the reason that performance mimicked the choices prescribed by formal logic.
In deontic contexts, expectations may be driven by utilities. If so, then utilities do not affect reasoning in the selection task directly, as Oaksford and Chater (1994) assumed, but only through shaping the set of expectations to be tested. Because perspective determines the utilities assigned to the different outcomes, perspective does not affect selection task reasoning directly. This means that reasoning in deontic contexts is not special, at least not with respect to the Wason selection task. Deontic contexts are only one kind of context in which people have strong beliefs about underlying dependency relations.
